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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950284-CA
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case begins with the routine traffic stop of a westbound
vehicle travelling interstate through Grand County, Utah, and ends
with sixteen thousand dollars being forfeited to the state.

The

record is deficient when viewed in terms of due process.

The

record is void of any link between the forfeiture of the currency
and the corresponding, requisite violation of Utah law.
POINT ONE:

UTAH LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FACTUAL APPEAL FROM A
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE A 60(b)
MOTION.

The Notice of Appeal of this matter had to be filed prior to
the date on which the hearing on the 60(b) Motion to Set Aside was
set. Therefore the decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside was made by the district court after the Notice was filed
herein. Thus, the first issue of the Brief of Appellant is styled

as an issue of the review of the trial court's findings for
correctness.
Unaware of the procedural chain of events, Appellee argues
that Appellant must appeal the 60(b) motion.

Appellee concedes

that the relief sought by appellant may be granted.

Appellee

states, "no Utah precedent has decided the precise issue of a
factual appeal from default which did not include the 60(b) motion,
[but] some jurisdictions disfavor any direct appeal from default
judgments."

Appellee's Brief at 7.

Appellee cites to dubious

authority (1970's cases from Arizona and Oregon) as his support for
this pronouncement.
Appellant maintains that the decision to be made by this Court
is governed by the 1992 case of In re One Hundred Two Thousand
Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 468 (Utah). The One Hundred Two
Thousand Dollars case is on all fours with the case to be decided
by this Court.

The trial court in the case sub judice

made no

findings with regard to § 58-37-13(1)(g)—perhaps because none
could be made.

Appellant is willing to assume arguendo

that the

currency discovered by Trooper Mecam was generated in a drug
transaction.

Never, however, was any evidence submitted that the

transaction took place in Utah.

This Court is bound by the

precedent of One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in which the Utah
Supreme Court stated, "Jt is not enough that
been generated
Utah."

Id.

in a drug transaction

at 470 (emphasis added).

which

the currency
took

place

may have
outside

of

The finding of the Utah

Supreme Court in that case could be repeated verbatim by this Court
in this case (with the exception that the automobile involved
herein is a Hyundai, not a van:
2

It is only when the Utah act is violated that drug proceeds
are subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13(1). Here, no
attempt was made by the State to prove that the money came
from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in this
state. No controlled substances were found in the van or on
the person of any of the occupants. No criminal charges were
filed against any of them. The van was merely passing through
Utah on an interstate highway.
Id.

The district court herein plainly erred when it granted the
state's petition for forfeiture of the currency.

This Court owes

the district court no particular deference and should review the
district court's findings, summary as they may be, for correctness
only.

Such a review will reveal that the district court has erred

in this instance.
POINT TWO:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN MAKING
INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT.

Like the trial court, Appellee is either unaware of Utah law
governing forfeiture, or chooses to ignore it. Appellee's argument
that the "unrefuted evidence" that the $16,000 "was found in close
proximity to a substance which field tested positive a [sic]
marijuana" is of limited relevance in light of One Hundred Two
Thousand Dollars.*

Appellee7s argument is irrelevant

in light of

the fact that no finding was made that the $16,000 was the proceeds
from a transaction which took place within the state of Utah.
The clear mandate of One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars is that
a connection must be made between the derivation of the currency
and the State of Utah.

No such connection was made in this case,

even though the hearing took place by default and no opportunity to
present contradictory evidence was given.

As it happens, no

contradictory evidence is required because no evidence of the
connection was ever presented.
3

Appellee cites Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-13(1)(g)(ii) which
states:
and

"there is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins,

currency

found

in

proximity

to

forfeitable

substances . . . are forfeitable under this

section;

controlled

the burden of

proof is upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption."
(Emphasis added.)

However, Appellee neglects to read subpart(ii)

in conjunction with subparagraph (g) which states that forfeitable
items are considered such because they are "furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in
of this
this

chapter";

they are "proceeds traceable to any violation

chapter";

or they

facilitate any
Chapter

58

violation

violation

has

ever

are moneys
of
been

this

"intended

chapter."

proven

or

to be used

of
to

No violation of
even

asserted.

The

uncontroverted testimony of Trooper Mecam is that Isidro Garcia was
travelling from Chicago back to his home in California. Transcript
at 6 (see Appendix).
It is not enough that
the currency
may have
been
generated
in a drug transaction
which took place outside
of
Utah.
It is only when the Utah act is violated that drug
proceeds are subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13(1).
Here, no attempt was made by the State to prove that the money
came from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in
this state. No controlled substances were found in the van or
on the person of any of the occupants. No criminal charges
were filed against any of them. The van was merely passing
through Utah on an interstate highway.
In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d
470 (emphasis added).
There was no evidence offered in the trial court that the Utah
act was violated.

The Hyundai was merely passing through Utah on

an interstate highway.

The subject $16,000 should not have been

subject to forfeiture.
4

POINT THREE:

THE TRIAL COURT

ERRED

IN REFUSING

TO GRANT A

CONTINUANCE.
Appellee states that the standard herein is one of abuse of
discretion.

Assuming that it is, Appellant maintains that the

trial court did abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance
in this matter where none had been previously granted the party
requesting it.
Appellant was not present or represented in the hearing in
this regard.

The matter had only been continued once previously,

and that was at the request of the Grand County Attorney. Two days
prior to the hearing, Isidro Garcia's attorney in California
requested a continuance for the purpose of being admitted pro
vice

or obtaining local counsel.

hac

This request was denied and the

default hearing was held in this matter.
Appellee cites the case of Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that "[t]he proper standard in
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding continuance is an
abuse of discretion standard."

Appellee's Brief at 9.

In the

Christenson opinion, Justice Stewart found that it was not an abuse
of discretion not to continue a trial based on the Plaintiff's
complaint that they were unaware of the testimony of Defendant's
expert until one day prior to the trial. Plaintiff therein argued
that they could not properly prepare.

The Court found that

Plaintiff had had the opportunity to interview and depose the
expert and therefor would not be allowed to complain that it was
taken by surprise.

This case is clearly dissimilar from the case

at bar herein.
Justices Hall/ Howe and Durham concurred in the Christenson
5

opinion.
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the basis of which is unknown.

Claimant's personal testimony was

essential to a finding in this instance as well.

There was no

basis for the denial of the continuance.
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated, "The request for
continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be disturbed.
Where there is some reasonable basis for the request it should not
be denied merely because it may work some inconvenience to the
other party." State v. Ma this, 319 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah 1957). The
basis of the request in this instance—so that claimant's attorney
could be in attendance pro hac vice

or obtain local counsel—was

certainly reasonable.
The claimant, Isidro Garcia had filed a pro se response within
the time periods allowed by statute, and had asserted a claim to
the funds.

The record also reflects that the Court considered a

Motion to Continue, which was denied without adequate findings.
Since the state already had possession of the funds, there was no
risk

that

the

monies

would

unavailable at a future date.

disappear

or

otherwise

be made

The state could therefore not have

been prejudiced by a continuance.

The claimant was entitled to a

full and fair hearing on the merits, of which he was deprived.
was not given the constitutional right to be heard.
Court

thereby

abused

its discretion

in refusing

He

The trial
to allow a

continuance.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, and in Appellants Initial
Brief this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, or
should remand the matter for additional proceedings.
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APPENDIX

Transcript of Proceedings before Trial Court

1

A.

I asked the passenger if he had any identification,

2

which he did.

3

of them —

4

anything with the vehicle.

5

passenger who the car belonged to.

6

Also the driver didn't know who owned the car.

I gave this to Trooper Porter.

Porter needed on<

names or anything, match anything to the vehicle or
And I distinctly remember asking th<
He stated he did not know.

7

Q.

What did you then do?

8

A.

While talking to the passenger, the odor of alcholi<

9

beverage was present on him.

I could smell that.

I asked the

10

passenger where he was coming from.

11

driven up from California and picked him up in Fort Morgan

12

because he was out of work and needed a ride home.

13

to the driver, he stated he had been to Chicago, was on his way

14

home and picked up Istophal (phonetic) hitchhiking.

15
16

I

He said the driver had

In talking

Q.

What did you then do?

A.

Run a check through dispatch on both subjects. I

17

believe I ran it through Grand County.

18

reason was down, 1038, computer was down.

19

Istophal (phonetic) had a III showing previous controlled

20

subtance charges.

21

THE COURT:

22

THE WITNESS:

23
24
25

Our dispatch for some
It showed that

Who is Istophal (phonetic)?
He was the passenger.

Q.

(By Mr. Benge)

After finding out that, what did yoi

A.

I approached Isidro on the fact that he didn't know

do?
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owner, operator, or a g e n t in c h a r g e of t h e controlled premises consents in writing.
1987
58-37-11.

District c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n to enjoin vio l a t i o n s — J u r y trial.
11> The district courts of this state shall have jurisdiction in proceedings in accordance with the rules of
those courts to enjoin violations of this act.
(2) If an alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under this section occurs, the
accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with
the rules of the district courts.
1971
58-37-12.

E n f o r c e m e n t — C o o r d i n a t i o n a n d coo p e r a t i o n of federal a n d s t a t e a g e n c i e s
— Powers.
The department and all law enforcement agencies
charged with enforcing this act shall cooperate with
federal and other state agencies in discharging their
responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances. To this end, they are authorized to:
(1) Arrange for the exchange of information
between governmental officials concerning the
use and abuse of dangerous substances.
(2) Coordinate and cooperate in training programs in controlled substance law enforcement
at the local and state levels.
(3) Cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bureau of Investigation by establishing a centralized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of drug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law
offenders within the state, and make the information available for federal, state, and local law
enforcement purposes.
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be extracted.
1971
58-37-13.

Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no
property right exists in them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment
of any kind used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of this chapter;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a
container for property described in Subsections
(l)(a) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with
health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections (l)(a)
and (1Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a
common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge of

58-37-13

the conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to violation of this chapter;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the
owner's knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject
to a bona Fide security interest is subject to
the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this chapter, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this chapter; but:
(i) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act; and
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption t h a t
all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances,
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances are forfeitable under
this section; the burden of proof is upon
claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-l, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act;
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation
of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real
property is subject to the bona fide security
interest of a party who could not have known
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act; and
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing,
or storage facility or interest in real property
may not be forfeited under this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street
value of any controlled substances found on
the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced
in controlled substances law enforcement
may testify to establish the street value of
the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection; and

58-37-13

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation to a violation of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, the Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or the Utah Controlled
Substances Precursor Act or any firearm,
weapon, or ammunition kept or located within
the proximity of controlled substances or other
property subject to forfeiture under any of those
acts.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any peace officer of this state
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property. However, seizure without process
may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection
under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this chapter;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended
to be used in violation of this chapter.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted
promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which
are seized or come into the possession of the state are
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the
state if the owners are unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I and II are derived which have
been planted or cultivated in violation of this chapter,
or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in
control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the court that no person is entitled
to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all
property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited

90

property in the enforcement of controlled substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over
the case shall award the property to the seizing
agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing
and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may not be applied by
the court to costs or fines assessed against any
defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no appli.
cation, any state agency, bureau, county, or mu.
nicipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if
within a prosecution district, the district attorney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the
forfeiture and upon application for the property
to the director of the Division of Finance. The
application shall clearly set forth the need for the
property and the use to which the property will
be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance
shall review all applications for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing
agency makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated
applicant or seizing agency, where no application
is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be
upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be
made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if
within a prosecution district, the district attorney where the property was seized or is to be
seized. The complaint shall be filed in the circuit
or district court if the property is not real property and the value is less than $10,000. The complaint shall be filed in the district court if the
value of property other than real property is
$10,000 or more or the property is real property.
If the complaint includes property under the jurisdiction of the circuit court and also property
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district
court, the complaint shall be filed in the district
court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and

91
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'in) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure
of the property which is the subject matter of the
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service,
unless the property has previously been seized
without a warrant under Subsection 58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county clerk, and
served together with a copy of the complaint,
upon all persons known to the county attorney or
district attorney to have a claim in the property
by one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last-known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is considered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this chapter,
any interested person or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in
the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the
county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the
seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20
days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
property as the court determines. If the county
attorney or district attorney h a s not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not
entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter
an order directing the county attorney or district
attorney to answer the petition within ten days.
If no answer is filed within t h a t period, the court
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may
present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and
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order forfeiture or release of the property as it
determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent
of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this chapter or the laws of this state.
<U When the court determines that claimants
have no right in the property in whole or in part,
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall dispose of the
property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property,
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it
shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it
sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for
the General Fund,
(k) In a proceeding under this section where
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the
property, against the individual or individuals
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and
may assess costs against any other claimant or
claimants to the property as appropriate.
1993
58-37-14.

Resort for illegal u s e or possession of
controlled substances deemed common nuisance — District court power
to suppress and enjoin.
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house,
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to
which users or possessors of any controlled substances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or
where use or possession of any substances violates
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing,
or selling any substances listed as controlled substances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or
maintain any such place.
(2) The district court has the power to make any
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nuisance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continuation of a nuisance.
1971
58-37-15.

Burden of proof in proceedings on violations — Enforcement officers exempt from liability.
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act,
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception
is upon the person claiming its benefit.
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or prescription issued under this act,
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license,
registration, order form, or prescription, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption.

